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FOLLOWING DATA: 
THE “DEFUND THE POLICE” 
MOVEMENT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS 
MICHAEL HEISE AND JASON P. NANCE* 
Nationwide calls to “Defund the Police,” largely attributable to Black 
Lives Matter demonstrations, have motivated derivative calls for public 
school districts to consider “defunding” school resource officer 
(“SRO/police”) programs. To be sure, school districts’ SRO/police 
programs endure as a subject of persistent scholarly and public scrutiny, 
particularly relating to how a school’s SRO/police presence influences the 
school’s student discipline reporting policies and practices. How schools 
report student discipline and whether the process involves referrals to law 
enforcement agencies matter, particularly as they may fuel a growing 
“school-to-prison pipeline.” The “school-to-prison pipeline” research 
literature features two general empirical claims. One is that public schools’ 
increasingly “legalized” approach toward student discipline increases the 
probability that students will be thrust into the criminal justice system. A 
second, distributional claim is that these adverse consequences 
disproportionately involve students of color, boys, students from low-income 
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. Results from our 
analyses that draw from the nation’s leading data set on public school crime 
and safety, supplemented by data on state-level mandatory reporting 
requirements and district-level per pupil spending, provide mixed support for 
these two claims. We find that a school’s SRO/police presence corresponds 
with an increased probability that the school will report student incidents to 
 
 * Heise is William G. McRoberts Professor in the Empirical Study of Law, Cornell Law 
School; Nance is University Term Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. A 
more comprehensive treatment of these issues, and from which this Essay substantially draws, 
“Defund the (School) Police”? Bringing Data to Key School-to-Prison Pipeline Claims, is 
forthcoming in 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (2021). We are grateful to three anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this Essay. Author correspondence: 
michael.heise@cornell.edu. 
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law enforcement agencies. However, we do not find support in the school-
level data for the broad distributional claims. While we take no normative 
positions on these complex and nuanced issues, we feel empirical evidence 
should inform the already ongoing legal and public policy debates on the 
future of school SRO/police programs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While it is not clear what structural, legal, and policy changes may 
emerge from recent and ongoing efforts to “Defund the Police,” attributable 
to the Black Lives Matter movement,1 one specific shift is already clear: A 
growing number of public school districts now confront related claims to 
“defund” school resource officer (“SRO/police”) programs that operate in 
 
 1 #DefundthePolice, BLACK LIVES MATTER (May 30, 2020), https://blacklivesmatter.com
/defundthepolice/ [https://perma.cc/R6EK-3J5P]; Lissandra Villa, Why Protesters Want to 
Defund Police Departments, TIME (June 7, 2020, 11:17 AM), https://time.com/58494
95/black-lives-matter-defund-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/6DNX-SXLB]; Rachel 
Hatzipanagos, What ‘Defund the Police’ Might Look Like, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020, 11:05 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/black-lives-matter-defund-police-
is-country-ready/ [https://perma.cc/CE32-R6V9]. 
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one-half of the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools.2  Despite 
sustained growth in a SRO/police presence in public schools over time, the 
full suite of costs and benefits for students, schools, and families attributable 
to SRO/police programs remains largely unknown.3  
Questions about, and challenges to, schools’ use of SRO/police continue 
to mount, and a paucity of helpful data complicates reasoned decision-
making.  While what to do about the growing SRO/police presence in our 
nations’ schools is far from clear, it is clear that policymakers should 
carefully examine data and engage in nuanced and dispassionate analysis.  
While we write on these issues much more comprehensively elsewhere,4 we 
hope our Essay contributes helpful data and analyses that might inform 
policymakers asked to decide the fates of schools’ SRO/police programs.  
The growing “school-to-prison pipeline” research literature features two 
general empirical claims that frame key debates about changes in how public 
schools approach student discipline.  One claim is that schools’ policies and 
approaches toward student discipline are becoming increasingly legalized.  
The steadily increasing SRO/police presence in the nation’s public schools 
both contributes to and reflects this trend.5  Aside from an array of factors 
that help accounts for an increased SRO/police presence in public schools, 
schools’ evolving posture toward student discipline raises important policy 
 
 2 Nader Issa & Fran Spielman, Northside College Prep Votes to Remove its  CPD Officers, 
Becomes First CPS School To Do So, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 8, 2020, 7:59 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/education/2020/7/8/21316997/northside-college-prep-
removes-chicacgo-police-officer-first-cps-school [https://perma.cc/37X9-VM57]; Ella 
Torres, Calls to Defund Police Shine Light on the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ABC NEWS (June 
18, 2020, 5:24 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/calls-defund-police-shine-light-school-
prison-pipeline/story?id=71195676 [https://perma.cc/5J8R-JMQF]; Katie Reilly, ‘Police Do 
Not Belong in Our Schools.’ Student Are Demanding an End to Campus Cops After the Death 
of George Floyd, TIME (June 5, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://time.com/5848959/school-contracts-
police/ [https://perma.cc/EF3B-DSA3]; Jessica Swarner, While the Push to Defund Phoenix 
Police Grows Stronger, Activists Want Officers Out of Schools, COOPER COURIER (June 16, 
2020, 10:44 AM), https://coppercourier.com/story/students-demand-remove-police-school-
campus-phoenix/ [https://perma.cc/BN34-4TPS]. 
 3 For examples of recent empirical research on SRO/police programs, see generally 
Michael Heise & Jason Nance, ‘Defund the (School) Police’? Bringing Data to Key School-
to-Prison Pipeline Claims, 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2021); Jason P. 
Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919 (2016); 
Mario S. Torres Jr., & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Demographics and Police Involvement: 
Implications for Student Civil Liberties and Just Leadership, 45 EDUC. AMIN. Q. 450 (2009); 
Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on School Crime 
and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 1 (2011). 
 4 See Heise & Nance, supra note 3. 
 5 See, e.g., id. (using 2015–16 SSOCS data); Nance, Students, supra note 3 (using 2009–
10 SSOCS data); Torres & Jacqueline, supra note 3 (analyzing 1999–2000 SSOCS data); Na 
& Gottfredson, Police, supra note 3 (analyzing various SSOCS data sets). 
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concerns.  An increasingly legalized school environment may contribute to a 
net increase in overall school safety and a concurrent decrease in school 
violence.  Even if such benefits are realized, potential important costs also 
lurk.  Absent a truly randomized, controlled experiment, efforts to assess and 
weigh the benefits and costs associated with schools’ increasingly legalized 
approach toward student discipline impose significant demands on potential 
research designs. 
Notwithstanding important research design challenges, much of the 
public and scholarly attention to schools’ evolving posture toward student 
discipline dwells on the possible negative spill-over effects and individual 
and social costs.  One potential cost involves students’ increased exposure to 
the criminal justice system flowing from changes to schools’ student 
disciplinary reporting practices.  This is especially so if schools’ motivations 
for this policy shift include a desire to functionally outsource responsibility 
for student discipline to law enforcement agencies.  Making matters worse is 
that referrals of student incidents to law enforcement—particularly lower-
level, non-violent, student incidents that were traditionally handled “in-
house”—often set in motion a series of legal events that can culminate in 
ways that deleteriously impact students’ lives.  Operationalizing this first 
general claim—that schools’ approach to student discipline is becoming 
increasingly legalized—contributes to the following hypothesis: as a school’s 
SRO/police presence increases, so too does the probability that the school 
will report student discipline incidents to law enforcement agencies. 
Persuaded that policy costs associated with schools’ increasingly 
legalized approach to student discipline outweigh the benefits, many critics 
quickly advance a second general claim: such a policy’s costs distribute 
unequally across various traditional sub-groups of students.6  Thus, a second 
hypothesis—an extension of the first—is that a school’s referrals of student 
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies disproportionately 
involve students of color, male students, students from low-income 
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. 
 
 6 See, e.g., Janel George, Populating the Pipeline: School Policing and the Persistence of 
the School-To-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 493, 494 (2016) (arguing that “ . . . children 
of color and low-income children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by 
police in schools”); Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the 
Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 180 (2015) (concluding that 
“there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that students of color and students with 
disabilities are funneled into the justice system due to the disparate impact of exclusionary 
discipline polices and discretionary arrests in schools”); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource 
Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 285–86 (2009) 
(finding evidence of a relation between school poverty levels and number of student arrests). 
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Despite both claims having already secured general acceptance in the 
school-to-prison pipeline literature, we find mixed empirical support when 
these two claims are subject to data from a recent iteration of the nation’s 
leading cross-sectional data set on public school crime and safety, the U.S. 
Department of Education’s 2015–16 School Survey on Crime and Safety 
(“SSOCS”).7  With respect to the first claim, we find evidence that increases 
in a school’s SRO/police presence corresponds with increases in the rate of 
school referrals of student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement.  Our 
findings on this first claim generally comport with prior studies that analyze 
earlier versions of the SSOCS data set.8 
At the same time, however, we do not find direct empirical support for 
the second claim: that school reports of student incidents to law enforcement 
systematically distribute unevenly across various student sub-groups.  Direct 
evidence on this specific claim is simply not possible owing to the absence 
in the SSOCS data set of any individual-level demographic data (e.g., 
race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on students whose conduct 
triggered a school referral to law enforcement.  This hypothesis certainly 
remains a viable possibility, as supportive anecdotal and related evidence 
exists.9 
Our narrower point is that there is no direct empirical support from the 
SSOCS data set that school referrals to law enforcement agencies raise 
 
 7 Various results also derive from the 2009–10 restricted-use version of the SSOCS data 
series. 
 8 See, e.g., Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 969–70; Torres & Stefkovich, supra note 3, 
at 461–63; Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 17–22. 
 9 See Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do not 
permit identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it remains 
“entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of color”); see 
also DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND 
RACIAL JUSTICE 6–7 (2011), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-educati
on/school-discipline/discipline-policies-successful-schools-and-racial-justice 
[https://perma.cc/RG7X-RDQA]; Catherine P. Bradshaw, Mary M. Mitchell, Lindsey M. 
O’Brennan & Philip J. Leaf, Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing to the 
Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 
508, 508 (2010) (discovering that after controlling for teacher ratings of students’ behavior 
problems, African American students were more likely than white students to be referred to 
the office for disciplinary reasons); Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding 
the Antecedents of the “School-to-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between Race and School 
Discipline, 101 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 653–54 (2011) (documenting that African 
American students are more likely than white students to be disciplined even after taking into 
account other salient factors such as grades, attitudes, gender, special education or language 
programs, and their conduct in school). 
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troubling distributional issues.10  Moreover, the weight of the indirect 
evidence from school-level data also does not hint at any troubling 
distributional outcomes.11  Notably, the paucity of supportive empirical 
evidence on this point contrasts with broader scholarly and public claims 
about uneven distributions of school discipline across various student sub-
groups.12 
 
 10 Language in at least one published paper invites some level of confusion by potentially 
advancing claims, albeit tentatively, about the disproportionate impacts on minority student 
sub-groups based on data on schools’ overall racial/ethnic, gender, and special education 
needs compositions. See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 23 (“We conclude that the results 
of our tests of interaction with percent in special education and percentage minority do not 
suggest a pattern of disproportionate impact of police use on socially or educationally 
disadvantaged populations.”). While perhaps such analyses provide not-implausible 
inferential support, without individual-level racial/ethnic, gender and special education needs 
data on the actual students referred to law enforcement agencies, more efficacious and helpful 
conclusions are simply not possible given the data limitations. Contributing to the confusions 
is that the Na & Gottfredson paper is aware of the unit of analysis limitation in the SSOCS 
data sets. See id. at 23–24 (“However, finer-grained analysis conducted at the individual-level 
might uncover patterns that our school-level analysis could not.”). 
 11 For similar results from earlier SSOCS data sets see, e.g., Nance, Students, supra note 
3, 972–73 (analyzing 2009–10 SSOCS data); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 23 (analyzing 
2003–04, 2005–06, and 2007–08 SSOCS data sets). See Michael Heise & Jason P. Nance, To 
Report or Not to Report: Data on Schools, Student Discipline, and a “School to Prison 
Pipeline,” CORNELL LEGAL STUD. RSCH. PAPER NO. 20-39 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677247 for an extended discussion of possible reasons why 
student incidents reported to law enforcement do not distribute unevenly across student racial 
sub-groups, which is particularly surprising in light of substantial empirical support 
demonstrating that racial disparities persist in other areas of education, the criminal justice 
system, and society generally. 
 12 See Erik J. Girvan, Towards A Problem-Solving Approach to Addressing Racial 
Disparities in School Discipline Under Anti-Discrimination Law, 50 MEMPHIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (providing an overview of racial disparities that exist in school 
exclusionary discipline); Russell J. Skiba, Robert S. Michael, Abra Carroll Nardo & Reece L. 
Peterson, The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School 
Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 319–20 (2002) (describing the overrepresentation of African 
American students in the administration of school discipline); John M. Wallace, Jr., Sara 
Goodkind, Cynthia M. Wallace, & Jerald G. Bachman, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender 
Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991–2005, 59 NEGRO 
EDUC. REV. 47, 48 (2008) (finding that Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students are 
more likely to be subject to exclusionary discipline than White and Asian American students); 
Jayanti Owens, Early Childhood Behavior Problems and the Gender Gap in Educational 
Attainment in the United States, 89 SOCIO. EDUC. 236, 253–54 (2016) (explaining that 
“[i]mplicit stereotypes may lead to increased grade retention and disproportionately harsh 
discipline, such as school suspension or expulsion”); Lauren Camera, Boys Bear the Brunt of 
School Discipline, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 22, 2016), https://www.usnews.com
/news/articles/2016-06-22/boys-bear-the-brunt-of-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/UD9Q-
SKVG] (explaining that “the same behavior problems in boys and girls were penalized a lot 
more in boys than girls”). 
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Our Essay unfolds as follows. Part II briefly summarizes the relevant 
research literature.  Part III describes our data and empirical strategy.  We 
present our results in Part IV and consider their legal and policy implications.  
Part V concludes and considers how current public debates on school 
SRO/police programs can be informed by available empirical evidence. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE INCREASED INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Over the last few decades, intersections between schools and the 
criminal justice system have increased significantly.  These intersections 
helped prompt the emergence of various policies and practices that have 
resulted in more students becoming part of the criminal justice system, either 
as youth or when they reach adulthood.  Such policies and practices include 
state statutes that require schools to notify law enforcement when students 
engage in certain wrongful acts.  For example, many states require schools 
to report students to law enforcement when students commit violent acts such 
as sexual assault,13 armed robbery,14 and attacking another student with a 
weapon.15  Several states also require schools to report students to law 
enforcement for various nonviolent crimes, such as possession of illegal 
drugs,16 possession of alcohol,17 theft,18 and vandalism.19  Other states 
require schools to report students to law enforcement for the commission of 
any felony or misdemeanor.20 
State statutes that criminalize adolescent misbehavior in schools also 
directly increase student engagement with the criminal justice system.  For 
 
 13 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 1012.799 (2018); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 115C-288 (2018). 
 14 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1308 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261 (2018); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:4 (2018). 
 15 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113 (2018); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902 (West 2018); 
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 4112(b)(3). 
 16 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-221 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184 (2018); 105 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6 (2018). 
 17 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-210 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2018); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 6A:16-6.4 (West 2018). 
 18 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:4 
(2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A (2018). 
 19 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A 
(2018). 
 20 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6143 (2018); MD. 
CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.15 (2018); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2801(2)(h) (McKinney 2018). 
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example, many states have passed so-called “disturbing school” statutes,21 
which can criminalize ordinary student misbehavior such as burping in 
class22 or texting in class and refusing to turn over a cell phone.23  Some 
estimate that thousands of students are charged each year for violating these 
statutes.24  Moreover, school exclusionary disciplinary practices, including 
suspension and expulsion, often are associated with increased student 
involvement with the criminal justice system.  When students are not in 
school, they are more likely to be left at home unsupervised, which can 
sometimes lead to involvement in criminal activity.25 
Predictably, strong relationships exist between exclusionary discipline 
practices and a student’s involvement in the criminal justice system as an 
adult.26  Students suspended in school are more likely to be arrested at some 
future point than those who are never suspended, even after controlling for 
other variables that might explain increased odds of arrest.27  Exclusionary 
discipline practices are also associated with academic underachievement and 
failing to graduate from high school;28 and failing to graduate from high 
 
 21 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West 
2018); FLA. STAT. § 871.01 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635.030 (West 2018); see 
also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Legal Architecture: Lessons from 
the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 103 (2017). 
 22 See A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2151 (2017). 
 23 See G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013). 
 24 Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence
/501149/ [https://perma.cc/EGN2-2JKD]; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 21, at 103. 
 25 American Academy of Pediatrics, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 112 
PEDIATRICS 1206, 1207 (2003);  see also TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A 
STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW STUDENT DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 26, 31–32, 70 (2011), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-conten
t/uploads/2020/01/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/92YZ-3J7
R]. 
 26 Thomas Mowen & John Brent, School Discipline as a Turning Point: The Cumulative 
Effect of Suspension on Arrest, 53 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 628, 642–43 (2016); 
Kerrin C. Wolf & Aaron Kupchik, School Suspension and Adverse Experiences in Adulthood, 
34 JUST. Q. 407, 421–22 (2017); Tracey L. Shollenberger, Racial Disparities in School 
Suspension and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1997, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE 
EXCLUSION 31, 36–40 (Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015). 
 27 Mowen & Brent, supra note 26, at 642–43; Wolf & Kupchik, supra note 26, at 421–22. 
 28 See, e.g., FABELO ET AL., supra note 25, at 54–59 (finding that students experiencing 
exclusionary discipline, who otherwise had statistically identical profiles to those who had not 
experienced exclusionary discipline, were more likely to drop out of school); Robert Balfanz, 
Vaughan Byrnes, & Joanna Fox, Sent Home and Put Off Track: The Antecedents, 
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school is associated with involvement in the criminal justice system, either 
as a youth or as an adult.29 
One extreme form of exclusionary discipline practices that have 
received considerable national attention are so-called “zero tolerance” 
policies.  The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 required state legislatures to 
pass statutes that expelled students for at least one year for bringing a firearm 
on school property as a condition for receiving federal education funds.30  
The Act validated the practice of “zero tolerance” and precipitated a new 
disciplinary mindset in many school districts across the nation.31  “Zero 
tolerance” policies require schools to administer specific disciplinary 
consequences regardless of the surrounding circumstances, the severity of 
the conduct, or the results of the behavior.32  These policies now extend 
beyond bringing a gun to campus and apply to infractions such as possession 
of illegal substances, sharp objects, and over-the-counter medication, dress 
code violations, tardiness, truancy, and fighting.33  “Zero tolerance” policies 
have led to severe disciplinary consequences for behavior such as bringing 
cough drops, fingernail clippers, scissors, squirt guns, and pocketknives to 
school; drawing a picture of a weapon; authoring a violent story; and 
 
Disproportionalities, and Consequences of Being Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED 
RSCH. ON CHILD. 1, 9 (2014) (finding that after controlling for course performance, attendance, 
and student demographics, a single suspension in the ninth grade increased the odds of 
dropping out of school (from 16% to 32%), and each additional suspension increased the odds 
by 20%); see also Jeffery H. Lamont, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Out-of-
School Suspension and Expulsion, 131 PEDIATRICS e1000, e1001 (2013); Girvan, supra note 
12. 
 29 See NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 
15 (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 2014) (explaining that high school 
dropouts are more likely to be institutionalized than those who are more educated), 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/ [https://perma.cc/LW94-TUW6]; CLIVE R. BELFIELD, 
HENRY M. LEVIN & RACHEL ROSEN, ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012) 




 30 20 U.S.C. § 7961 (2020). 
 31 See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero 
Tolerance in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2011–) 
(explaining that “[p]assage of the Gun-Free Schools Act signaled an important validation of 
zero tolerance school discipline practices by the federal government”). 
 32 Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in 
Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCH. 852, 852 (2008). 
 33 See generally CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-
TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79–80 (2010) (describing the expansion 
of zero tolerance policies beyond expulsions for possessing firearms). 
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pretending to shoot a gun with one’s hands.34  Scholars and youth advocates 
have criticized zero tolerance policies as ineffective, counterproductive, and 
unnecessarily putting students at risk of increased association with the 
criminal justice system.35 
Significantly, many scholars and commentators also have pointed out 
that increased intersections between schools and the criminal justice system 
impact student groups differently.  For example, studies imply that schools 
serving higher concentrations of students of color are comparatively more 
likely to employ various combinations of surveillance measures.36  These 
findings largely persist even after controlling for other school characteristic 
and student demographic information such as student poverty, percentage of 
students performing poorly on academic assessments, school crime, school 
disorder and disciplinary problems, and school administrators’ perceptions 
of the level of criminal activity in the neighborhoods in which the schools 
reside.37 
 
 34 See DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE 2–4 (2016). 
 35 See, e.g., Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 32, at 857; Derek 
W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 837–
41 (2015); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HARV. UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE 





 36 See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 
66 EMORY L. J. 765, 805–11 (2017) (finding that “higher concentrations of minority students 
are predictive of greater odds that schools rely on . . . designated combinations of security 
measures”); Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L. J. 1, 27–43 (2013) 
(finding that “a school’s percentage of minority students is a strong predictor of whether a 
school uses a combination of strict security measures”); see also Jeremy D. Finn & Timothy 
J. Servoss, Security Measures and Discipline in American High Schools, in CLOSING THE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 44, 49 (Daniel J. 
Losen ed., 2015) (finding that “the percentage of Black students enrolled was more highly 
related to security levels than was any other characteristic”); Timothy J. Servoss & Jeremy D. 
Finn, School Security: For Whom and with What Results?, 13 LEADERSHIP & POL’Y IN SCHS. 
61, 80 (2014) (“In sum, a high proportion of Black students in a school is related to the degree 
of security the school implements above and beyond all other characteristics we studied.”); 
Katarzyna Steinka-Fry, Benjamin Fisher & Emily Tanner-Smith, Visible School Security 
Measures Across Diverse Middle and High School Settings: Typologies and Predictors, 11 J. 
OF APPLIED SEC. RSCH. 422, 424 (2016) (finding that a school’s use of intense security 
measures was associated with serving higher concentrations of African American and low-
income students). 
 37 Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 36, at 805–11; Nance, Students, Security, and 
Race, supra note 36, at 32–41; Finn & Servoss, supra note 36, at 49; Finn & Servoss, supra 
note 36, at 79–80. 
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B. THE GROWING SRO/POLICE PRESENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
A key component of the increased intersections between schools and the 
criminal justice system involves the growing SRO/police presence in public 
schools.  Many schools rely on SRO/police officers to assist with student 
surveillance, deter school violence and student misbehavior, and help create 
an orderly school environment.38  The National Association of School 
Resource Officers (NASRO) believes that “[s]chool-based policing is the 
fastest-growing area of law enforcement.”39  Evidence documenting claims 
of a steadily growing police presence in public schools remains largely 
uncontested.  While in the late 1970s the total number of police officers 
assigned to public schools was fewer than 100,40 by 2007 the number 
approached almost 20,000.41 
Complementing the growth in the raw number of SRO/police assigned 
to schools is the increasing percentage of schools that report a police 
presence.  More precise estimates of this increase derive from SSOCS data 
sets.  For example, 2007–08 SSOCS data (weighted) reveal an SRO/police 
official was present at least one day a week in 21.1% of the sampled 
schools.42  The 2015–16 SSOCS data set reveals that in less than one decade 
the percentage (50%) more than doubled.43  While both the absolute growth 
 
 38 In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a survey to identify the reasons why 
schools had SROs. See LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & JULIE K. COON, CENT. FOR CRIMINAL JUST. 
RSCH. UNIV. CINCINNATI, THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY: A 
NATIONAL SURVEY 85 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211676.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PV9H-J96N]. Forty-two percent of the principals surveyed indicated that 
“[n]ational media attention about school violence” was the primary reason; 17.5% indicated 
“[d]isorder problems (e.g., rowdiness, vandalism); 6.1% indicated that “[p]arents wanted an 
officer in the school;” 3.7% indicated that it was the “[l]evel of violence in the school;” and 
48.2% indicated that it was for “[o]ther” reasons. Id. at 85. See also F. CHRIS CURRAN, 
BENJAMIN W. FISHER, SAMANTHA L. VIANO & AARON KUPCHIK, UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL 
SAFETY AND THE USE OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN UNDERSTUDIED SETTINGS 18–22 
(2020) (describing activities of SROs in schools), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants
/254621.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RTL-LAU5]. 
 39 About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://www.nasro.org/main/
about-nasro/ [https://perma.cc/J69E-A8UG] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 
 40 Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 946; Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya 
Phenix, School-Police Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools: An Analysis of New York 
City’s Impact Schools Initiative, 39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 456 (2007); Paul J. Hirschfield 
& Katarzyna Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the Criminalization of 
School Discipline, 5 SOCIO. COMPASS 1, 1 (2011). 
 41 NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43126, SCHOOL RESOURCE 
OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 5 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43126.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2Z6-Q9SA]. 
 42 For a general description see, e.g., Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 14. 
 43 See infra Sub-Part III, tbl.1 (displaying results from weighted sample). 
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in the number of SRO/police officers working in schools as well as in the 
relative share of schools that use them in schools are well understood, reasons 
explaining these growth trends are comparatively less understood.  Scholars 
observe that schools’ reliance on SRO/police has increased in tandem with 
their reliance on criminal justice-oriented measures and punitive disciplinary 
policies generally for the reasons discussed above.44  Many point specifically 
to rising youth crime rates from the mid-1980s to 1994 as well as to highly-
publicized incidents of school violence as major driving forces for the 
increase.45 
Another likely source of this growth involves the availability of public 
funds to hire SRO/police officers.  In the aftermath of the tragic shootings at 
Columbine High School the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
Community Policing Services initiated and implemented the “COPS in 
Schools” grant program in 1999.46  According to the most recent publicly-
available financial data, the COPS program has awarded in excess of $914 
million in grants to help hire more than 7,967 SROs.47  Additional federal 
funding sources include a collaborative effort involving the U.S. 
Departments of Justice, Education, and Health and Human Services.  During 
its first decade (1999–2009), the resultant “Safe Schools/Healthy Students” 
program has provided more than $2.1 billion in an array of programs, 
 
 44 See supra Sub-Part II. 
 45 See, e.g., CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO, & KUPCHIK, supra note 38, at 16–17; Ben Brown, 
Evaluations of School Policing Programs, in THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 327, 327 (Jo Deakin et al. eds., 
2018); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison 
Pipeline Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2015 (2019); Theriot, supra note 6, at 280. 
Following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida in 2018, the Florida State Legislature 
mandated that “each district school board and school district superintendent shall partner with 
law enforcement agencies or security agencies to establish or assign one or more safe-school 
officers at each school facility within the district . . . .” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.12 (West 
2020). 
 46 For a general description see, e.g., Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 47 MARIEKE BROCK, NORMA KRIGER & RAMÓN MIRÓ, SCHOOL SAFETY POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 1990–2016, at 78, 79, 81 
(2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251517.pdf [https://perma.cc/U363-V6Y
G]. 
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including those that help fund SROs in schools.48  Several states also provide 
funding to support bringing SROs into schools.49 
Interestingly, decisionmakers continue to place more SRO/police into 
the nation’s schools even though strikingly little is known about SRO/police 
officers’ effectiveness in terms of increasing school safety and decreasing 
school violence and crime.50  To be sure, it remains difficult to over-
emphasize the benefits associated with increases in school safety and 
decreases in school violence and crime.  While whether bolstering a school’s 
SRO/police presence, in fact, contributes to realizing such goals remains 
uncertain, evidence of possible negative costs attributable to a school’s 
SRO/police presence is comparatively less uncertain and warrants attention. 
C. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS OF SRO/POLICE PRESENCE IN SCHOOLS 
Framed by research literatures exploring the concurrent growth of “high 
stakes” student discipline policies and the growing presence of SRO/police 
in schools, our Essay seeks to directly engage with the nascent empirical 
literature.  Specifically, we explore the potential relations between the 
presence of SRO/police in a school and that school’s probability of referring 
student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies. 
In leading earlier empirical work on this topic one of the authors of this 
Essay finds that “a police officer’s regular presence at a school is predictive 
of greater odds that [such] school officials refer students to law 
enforcement . . . , including [for] seemingly minor offenses.”51  While 
Nance’s prior work remains important, it uses an earlier (2009-10) SSOCS 
data set.  Moreover, Nance’s earlier analyses rely on raw rather than weighted 
data, do not include per pupil spending information, and pursue slightly 
different empirical strategies than those pursued here.  Any technical or 
 
 48 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Awards More Than $32.8 Million 
to Promote Safe Schools, Healthy Students (July 10, 2009), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/us-department-education-awards-more-328-million-promote-safe-schools-healthy-
students [https://perma.cc/5W3N-EJ4G]. 
 49 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2020) (allocating funding for “safety plans 
involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school safety resource 
officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school environment”); 24 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. § 13-1302-A (West 2020) (authorizing grants to cover costs associated with 
compensating school resource officers); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4302 (West 2020) 
(mandating that the “Tennessee school safety center . . . establish school safety grants to assist 
LEAs in funding programs that [include] . . . school resource officers . . . .”). 
 50 See, e.g., JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 41, at 9; see also Na & Gottfredson, supra 
note 3, at 5–6 (criticizing most evaluations of SRO programs as limited to descriptive statistics 
and various self-reported perceptions of school and student safety). 
 51 Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 927. 
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coding adjustments notwithstanding, in many ways this Essay seeks, in part, 
to update, expand, and build upon Nance’s earlier work. 
Other scholars have also exploited earlier versions of the SSOCS data 
set. Na and Gottfredson, for example, drew from the 2007-08 SSOCS data 
set and found results that generally comport with Nance’s subsequent study 
finding a positive relation between the number of SRO/police officers at a 
school and that school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law 
enforcement.52  Unlike Nance’s study, Na and Gottfredson’s models do not 
control for such factors as a state’s mandatory reporting requirements.  
Despite important methodological limitations, Na and Gottfredson went on 
to conclude, in part, that the addition of police officers in schools correlated 
with a move to “redefine disciplinary situations as criminal justice problems 
rather than social, psychological, or academic problems, and accordingly 
increases the likelihood that students are arrested at school.”53  As it relates 
to the “conventional wisdom” surrounding concerns with distributional 
issues incident to the “school-to-prison pipeline” hypothesis, Na and 
Gottfredson found “no evidence of adverse impact of police officer presence 
on minority groups or on special education populations.”54  Of course, Na 
and Gottfredson’s conclusion pivots on school-level racial/ethnic (and other) 
data as opposed to student-level data on the actual students involved in 
school reports to law enforcement agencies.  Nance, using similar SSOCS 
data sets, concluded that strong distributional claims about school reporting 
practices were not prudent given the data limitations.55 
Aside from our own work56 we have thus far not found any other 
published article that focuses on a possible relation between a school’s rate 
of reporting incidents to law enforcement and the presence and magnitude of 
law enforcement at the schools using the more recent 2015–16 SSOCS data 
set.57  We are similarly unaware of any published work that includes 
 
 52 It is perhaps worth noting that in supplemental analyses Na and Gottfredson drew on 
even earlier SSOCS data sets (2003–04, 2005–06, 2007–08). See Na & Gottfredson, supra 
note 3, at 19 (tbl.2). 
 53 Id. at 24. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See, e.g., Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do 
not permit identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it 
remains “entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of 
color”). 
 56 See Heise & Nance, supra note 3. 
 57 We want to acknowledge that the U.S. Dep’t of Educ. has published a report that both 
promotes and summarizes a few variables from the SSOCS 2017–18 data set. See MELISSA 
Diliberti, MICHAEL Jackson, SAMUEL Correa & ZOE Padgett, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and 
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statistical controls for state reporting requirements and student per pupil 
spending. 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our study exploits the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set on public 
school crime and safety and supplements those data with complementary 
information from other data sets.  We test our research hypotheses by 
estimating fractional response regression models. 
A. DATA 
The main source of data for this study draws from the U.S. Department 
of Education’s School Survey on Crime and Safety for the 2015–16 school 
year (“SSOCS”).58  We use the restricted-access version of the SSOCS data 
set that benefits from more granular school-level counts of the number of 
incidents that schools reported to law enforcement agencies as well as the 
number of full- and part-time SRO/police officers at each school.59 
To construct its sample, drawn from the universe of American public K-
12 schools, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) exploited 
the 2013–14 school year Common Core of Data Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe File (“CCD”)60 to help insure that 
the weighted SSOCS data set reflects a representative sample of American 
 
Safety in U.S. Public Schools: Findings from the School Survey on Crime and Safety: 2017–
18 (2019) [https://perma.cc/B53T-EGL4]. 
 58 Various results discussed in this Essay also derive from the restricted-use version of the 
2009–10 SSOCS data series. 
 59 Institute of Education Science, Data Security Office, User License No.19110005. The 
public version of the SSOCS data set and codebook are available at 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018109 [https://perma.cc/V6SR-T8N9]. 
The restricted-use version of the 2015–16 SSOCS data set includes “a higher level of detail in 
the data compared to public-use data files.”; see Statistical Standards Program: Getting 
Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp 
[https://perma.cc/P7FA-URCE] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). Importantly, to align our study 
with previous studies our focus on SRO/police includes only school resource officers and other 
sworn law enforcement officials. Our focus on sworn law officials, therefore, excludes any 
security guards or other individual who may contribute to school safety but who are neither a 
sworn nor formally trained law enforcement official. 
 60 The Common Core of Data (CCD) “is an annual NCES collection of fiscal and nonfiscal 
data on all public schools, public school districts, and state education agencies in the United 
States.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–2016 SCHOOL SURVEY ON 
CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS), Restricted-Use Data File User’s Manual 15 (Nov. 2017) 
[hereinafter “Codebook”] (on file with author). For additional descriptions of the CCD see, 
e.g., Nance, Students, supra note 3, 959–60 (describing the CCD); Helen M. Marks & Jason 
P. Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal 
Influence on Instruction and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10–11 (2007) (same). 
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public K-12 schools.61  Insofar as this study seeks information on “typical” 
or “regular” schools, those schools classified as something other than 
“regular” were excluded from analyses.62  Finally, to facilitate inferences to 
the broader universe of “regular” public schools, the approximately 1,890 
schools used in the analyses were weighted to generate population-level 
estimates.63 
Our study supplements the SSOCS data set in two important ways that 
potentially inform the probability of a school reporting an incident to law 
enforcement agencies.  First, we supplement the school-level SSOCS 
information with state-level information on what circumstances—and for 
what particular student offenses or incidents—do federal or state laws 
compel a school to report an incident to law enforcement agencies.64  Federal 
law, for example, mandates that all local education agencies (i.e., school 
districts) receiving federal education funding pursuant to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (which includes virtually every “regular” public K-
12 school) create and implement a policy “requiring referral to the criminal 
justice or juvenile delinquency system of any student who brings a firearm 
or weapon to a school . . . .”65  Such statutes eliminate (or severely reduce) 
schools’ discretion insofar as the statutes require them to report certain 
activities that occur on school property to law enforcement regardless of the 
surrounding or any mitigating circumstances.  At the same time, many state 
statutes go beyond federally imposed requirements and mandate that schools 
 
 61 The total number of public schools sampled was 3,550; 2,090 schools submitted 
completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 62.9% (weighted sample; 58.9% (raw 
sample)). See Codebook, supra note 60, at 1, 28; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–2016 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS), Public-Use 
Data File User’s Manual 1 (Mar. 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubi
d=2018107 [https://perma.cc/SLN9-3TMY]. 
 62 Among the 2,090 schools in the SSOCS data set, 1,890 (or 90.4%) were identified as a 
“regular public school” (as opposed to public charter or magnet school) and serve as the focus 
of this study. This Essay’s focus on “regular” public schools is consistent with parallel 
empirical work, particularly in the school finance literature. See, e.g., IVY MORGAN & ARY 
AMERIKANER, FUNDING GAPS 2018: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3 (2018). 
 63 Data in most of our analyses used the final analysis weight (“FINALWGT”) variable. 
Such sample weighting is “necessary to obtain population-based estimates, to minimize bias 
arising from differences between responding and nonresponding schools, and to calibrate the 
data to known population characteristics in a way that reduces sampling error.” Codebook, 
supra note 60, at 20. 
 64 In this way our current study more helpfully aligns with Nance’s prior study of 2009–
10 SSOCS data. See Nance, Students, supra, note 3. 
 65 20 U.S.C. § 7961(b)(1) (2015). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.07(g) (West 2014) 
(mandating that any student who brings a firearm or weapon to any school function will be 
referred to the juvenile justice system). 
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also refer to law enforcement a range of student incidents and offenses that 
do not involve a firearm or weapon.66 
The second way we supplement the SSOCS data set involves the 
inclusion of school district-level data on current per pupil spending.  We 
settled on current expenditures partly as it facilitates comparisons of student 
investment across the widest array of studies in the school finance 
literature.67  To do so, we matched district-level spending data from the 2016 
U.S. Census Bureau’s publicly available annual survey of public elementary 
and secondary schools onto the SSOCS data set.68  As well, the school 
district-level current per pupil spending data were adjusted for cost-of-living 
variation across the more than 13,000 public school districts with data from 
the Comparable Wage Index.69 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This Essay’s analytic focus dwells on the possible relation between the 
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence and the school’s rate of 
reporting student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies.  To this 
end, schools reported the total recorded number of student disciplinary 
incidents that took place at their school during the 2015–16 school year as 
well as the sub-set of those incidents that resulted in referrals to law 
enforcement agencies. 
The various student discipline incidents that prompted school reports to 
law enforcement agencies contributed to the creation of two related 
dependent variables.  One captures a school’s rate of student incident reports, 
if any, to law enforcement agencies.  Insofar as the types of incidents that 
schools reported to law enforcement include both violent (e.g., rape and 
armed robbery) as well as non-violent (e.g., vandalism and possession of 
alcohol) incidents, we felt that the subset of non-violent student incidents 
 
 66 See supra Part II. 
 67 For a discussion see, e.g., Michael Heise, Per Pupil Spending and Poverty’s Persistent 
Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of 2016 District-Level NCES Data, 45 J. EDUC. FIN. 149, 154–
57 (2019). 
 68 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 PUBLIC ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY EDUCATION FINANCE 
DATA (2016), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-
education-finance.html [https://perma.cc/F23E-TK3T]. 
 69 For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index, see generally 
LORI L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., A COMPARABLE WAGE APPROACH TO GEOGRAPHIC COST ADJUSTMENT (2006), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006321.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3RB-NX73]. For a discussion 
of some of the limitations of the CWI adjustment, see, e.g., Heise, supra note 67, at 154–57; 
Thomas A. DeLuca, Instructional Spending Metrics: A Multilevel Analysis Using NCES Data, 
44 J. EDUC. FIN. 23, 42 (2018). 
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warranted close inspection as well.  This is especially true because some 
schools may have been systematically less inclined to report non-violent 
student incidents to law enforcement agencies.  For this reason, we 
constructed a separate, related dependent variable designed to capture a 
school’s rate of student incident reports to law enforcement for the subset of 
non-violent student incidents.  Our decision to transform raw school report 
counts into school report rates seeks to account for variation in school size or 
scale (expressed in terms of student enrollment) across the sampled 
schools.70 
A descriptive summary of our dependent variables, presented in Table 
1, illustrates that almost one-half (49%) of the schools in our weighted 
sample reported at least one student incident to law enforcement agencies 
during the 2015–16 school year. The mean rate of school reports to law 
enforcement is just under one (0.77) per 100 students.71 The mean rate of 
school reports involving non-violent student incidents is well under one-half 
(0.33) per 100 students.72 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Insofar as our analytical focus dwells on the possible relation between 
a school’s rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies 
and the magnitude of the school’s law enforcement presence, our key 
independent variables of interest relate to a school’s SRO/police presence, if 
any.73  As Table 1 illustrates, one-half of the sampled schools report any law 
 
 70 Unreported alternative specifications exploring schools’ rates of student disciplinary 
incident reports to police using the square root of the rate as its distribution is less distorted 
for schools that reported no such incidents. Results from these unreported analyses do not 
materially differ from our results that derive from non-transformed rates. See infra, tbl.2. 
 71 Thus, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600 students 
(595.4), on average each school reported just over four (4.6) student incidents. Because only 
49% of schools reported any incidents, the effective mean number of incident reports to law 
enforcement is approximately nine student incidents among those schools that reported any 
incidents. 
 72 Similarly, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600 
students (595.4), on average each school reported just under two (1.98) non-violent incidents. 
Because only 49% of schools reported any incidents, violent or non-violent, the effective mean 
number of non-violent incident reports to law enforcement is approximately four non-violent 
incidents among those schools that reported any incidents. 
 73 Consistent with SSOCS data set coding protocols, a school’s SRO/police presence is 
construed in terms of whether a school has an SRO or sworn law enforcement officer at the 
school at least one day a week. The SRO/police calculation excludes any security guards or 
other individuals contributing to school safety who are not sworn law enforcement officers. 
See Institute of Education Science, supra note 59. 
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enforcement presence; the mean SRO/police presence is just under one (0.84) 
official per school.74 
In addition to the magnitude of its SRO/police presence, a school’s 
probability of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies is 
certainly also the function of a complex interaction of other variables.  The 
inclusion of such variables is necessary to help control for various factors’ 
influence on schools’ student incident reports to law enforcement agencies 
that are independent of factors located at the focal point of this study—the 
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence.  The various control variables 
we consider loosely organize into two general categories: school- and 
student-level factors. 
D. SCHOOL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
As we seek to estimate models assessing the probability of a school 
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies, such factors as a 
school’s base “disorder” level and student enrollment “turbulence” within a 
school, a school’s urbanicity score, and an assessment of the general crime 
level where the school is located are important as they likely inform the 
school’s reporting rates.  To measure a school’s base “disorder” level we 
constructed a school disorder variable by indexing a school’s total number of 
recorded student disciplinary incidents (per 100 students).75  A school’s 
student enrollment turbulence measure is the percentage of the school’s 
students who either transferred into or out of the school during the 2015–16 
school year.  As well, school “urbaniticity,” based on the school’s geographic 
location, is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from “rural” to “urban.”  
Finally, a three-point scale assessing a school’s general crime level measure 
derives from school administrators’ perceptions of general crime levels in the 
geographic area in which their school is located. 
While many key variables already account for variation in student 
enrollment across schools, we include a school’s raw student enrollment as a 
separate independent variable to help capture whether a school’s scale exerts 
any influence on its student discipline reporting behaviors.  For similar, 
though distinct, reasons, we also include a variable measuring each school’s 
 
 74 Insofar as only one-half of the schools in our sample report any SRO/police present at 
least once a week, the effective number of law enforcement officials at schools that report any 
is approximately 1.6 per school. 
 75 A school’s total “recorded” student disciplinary incidents forms the universe from 
which the subset of student disciplinary incidents that the school “reported” to law 
enforcement agencies derives. That is, while every school report to law enforcement agencies 
involved, by definition, a recorded student disciplinary incident, not every recorded student 
disciplinary incident culminated in a school report to a law enforcement agency. 
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student-to-teacher ratio.  To the extent that smaller schools, or schools 
benefitting from a higher percentage of adults, specifically teachers, are more 
likely to facilitate the emergence of a comparatively healthier school 
“climate” or “culture,” we hypothesize that school reporting to law 
enforcement agencies is more likely in larger and potentially more 
impersonal schools. 
Along with student enrollment, student-to-teacher ratios, school 
disruption, and enrollment turbulence, another factor plausibly contributing 
to a school’s overall climate and culture involves a school’s fiscal strength.  
For this we turn to a standard proxy, annual (2015–16) current per pupil 
spending.  We do so because we wondered whether variation in the 
distribution of student investment across schools might contribute to 
variation in their rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement 
agencies.  And even if such a relation or its direction are not obvious, school 
fiscal data may capture other unobservable aspects of a school or its culture 
that warrant controlling for. 
To accomplish this, we exploit the leading source of school district-level 
per pupil spending data: U.S. Census Bureau’s annual survey of public 
elementary and secondary schools for financial information76 supplemented 
by the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education 
Statistics Comparable Wage Index that adjusts for cost-of-living variation 
across the nation’s public school districts.77  We settled on current 
expenditures partly as it facilitates comparisons of student investment across 
the widest array of studies in the school finance literature.78  As Table 1 
makes clear, across all the schools in our sample, mean current per pupil 
spending exceeded $11,000 for the sampled schools in 2015–16. 
Because mandatory school reporting obligations for various student 
incidents bear squarely on our dependent variables of interest, our models 
also control for whether schools were statutorily obligated to report various 
incident types to law enforcement agencies under prevailing state law.79  To 
 
 76 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COM., 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education 
Finance Data https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-
education-finance.html [https://perma.cc/R5P8-HNRU]. 
 77 For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index, see generally 
LORI L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., A COMPARABLE WAGE APPROACH TO GEOGRAPHIC COST ADJUSTMENT (2006), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006321.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UDK-FJHH]. For a discussion 
of some of the limitations of the CWI adjustment, see, e.g., DeLuca, supra note 69, at 42. 
 78 For a discussion, see, e.g., Heise, supra note 67, at 154–57. 
 79 Our focus on state-specific mandatory reporting statutes implicitly acknowledges that 
while application of relevant federal reporting requirements, by definition, should not have 
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do so, we drew from the relevant statutes and regulations in all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia. Where a clear and relatively unambiguous 
mandatory reporting obligation existed, our dummy variable is coded as “1.”  
To focus our analyses of the sub-pool of non-violent student discipline 
incidents we include two separate mandatory reporting variables: one for 
violent student incidents; the other for non-violent incidents. 
Finally, even though the majority of public schools in the United States 
are elementary schools and, as Table 1 illustrates,80 our sample reflects this 
(59% of the sampled schools are elementary schools), the majority of school 
crime and violence occurs in middle and high schools.  Despite the skewed 
distribution of school crime and violence across school levels, we remain 
mindful that the Sandy Hook (CT) Elementary School tragedy in December 
2012 unfolded only a few years prior to the data gathering efforts that 
culminated in the 2015–16 SSOCS data set.  Consequently, we approached 
this study with a heightened curiosity about how elementary schools might 
systematically differ from middle and high schools in terms of their proclivity 
to report student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies.  To 
explore this we include in our models a dummy variable coded for “1” for 
elementary schools.81  Insofar as the reference group for interpreting the 
elementary school dummy variable includes all “non-elementary” schools,82 
what we expect to find is that elementary schools report systematically fewer 
school incidents reports to law enforcement and have a comparatively 
smaller SRO/police presence. 
E. STUDENT-FOCUSED VARIABLES 
In addition to the variables summarized above, key student-focused 
factors, especially those factors reflecting possible student marginalization, 
likely influence a school’s rate of student incident reporting to law 
enforcement agencies.83 Factors aligning with various student 
 
varied across the schools in our sample, state-level mandatory reporting requirements, by 
contrast, did vary. 
 80 For purposes of this study, an “elementary” school is defined to include a regular school 
whose grade levels range from pre-kindergarten through, but not higher than, eighth. 
 81 For purposes of this study, a school facility was coded as an “elementary” school if the 
highest grade level present in the school facility was at (or below) the eighth grade or lower 
and if the lowest grade level present was at (or below) the third grade. 
 82 This reference group includes all middle and high schools, as well as schools that 
combine middle and high school grades. 
 83 See, e.g., DAVID CANTOR & MAREENA M. WRIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL CRIME 
PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES OF CRIME 
REPORTED TO POLICE 8 (2002), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studies-school-
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marginalization theses and inserted into in our models include a school’s 
percentage of all nonwhite (including black) and black students as well as the 
percentage of students from low-income households.84  Moreover, as boys 
are more likely than girls to trigger school discipline matters, we also control 
for a school’s percentage of male students.85  Table 1 presents basic summary 
statistics on all the variables considered in our various models.   
  
 
violence/school-crime-pattern.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH99-ECNG] (finding that large high 
schools located in urban areas serving a high percentage of minority students tend to 
experience more school crime); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 38, at 20 (observing that crime 
is more common in schools that serve students from disadvantaged background). See also 
generally Nance, Students, supra note 3; Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, Race, Poverty, 
and Exclusionary School Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and 
High Schools, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 332 (2014). 
 84 The students from low-income household variable is construed to include those students 
eligible to participate in a free- or reduced-lunch program. For a general discussion of various 
student poverty measures, see, e.g., Heise, supra note 67, at 158. 
 85 For example, compare Skiba, Michael, Nardo & Peterson, supra note 12, at 4 (“In 
virtually every study presenting school disciplinary data by gender, boys are referred to the 
office and receive a range of disciplinary consequences at a significantly higher rate than 
girls”) and Wallace, Goodkind, Wallace & Bachman, supra note 12, at 54 (2008) (“Within 
racial and ethnic subgroups, boys are consistently more likely than girls of the same racial or 
ethnic group to have experienced school discipline”), with Nance, Students, supra note 3, at 
972–73 (reporting “mixed” results as it relates to the influence of various student background 
characteristics of school incident reports to law enforcement). 
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Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Dep. vars:   
Rate of sch. police reports [all] 0.77 1.92 
Rate of sch. police reports [non-violent] 0.33 0.79 
Ind. vars:   
Number of full- and part-time SRO/police at school 0.84 2.44 
School student:teacher ratio 17.79 23.58 
School student mobility % (in/out) 15.05 14.02 
School urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4) 2.51 1.14 
School disorder report rate (per 100 students) 1.57 3.10 
School area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3) 1.31 0.58 
School student enrollment 595.4 413.9 
Elementary school (1=yes) 0.59 0.49 
Mand. sch. violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.90 0.30 
Mand. sch. non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.69 0.46 
Sch. student poverty % 56.15 27.29 
Sch. student nonwhite % 43.1 32.92 
Sch. student black % 12.46 20.91 
Sch. student male % 49.7 9.1 
Sch. dist. mean per pupil spending (2016 $s) 11,196 5,153 
NOTES: Reported means and standard deviations derive from the SSOCS weighted 
sample; N (raw)=1,890. 
SOURCES: U. S. Dep’t Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Stat., 2015-16 School Survey on Crime 
and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dep’t Com., Census Bureau, 2016 Public Elementary-
Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
F. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our principal research question considers whether the magnitude of a 
school’s SRO/police presence influences a school’s propensity to report 
student discipline incidents to law enforcement agencies.  To investigate this 
question, we estimate fractional response regression models of a continuous 
86 HEISE & NANCE [Vol. 110 Online 
rate (or fractional) variable—the rate of school incident reports to law 
enforcement—that is bounded between zero and one.86 
G. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY LIMITATIONS 
While the SSOCS persists as the nation’s leading source of data on 
public school crime and safety, it is not without limitations.  For example, 
while data exist on a variety of school- and student-level measures, including 
a school’s gender and racial/ethnic profiles, the data set does not include 
gender or racial information on the actual students involved in the 
disciplinary incidents that triggered school reports to law enforcement 
agencies.  The absence of such information functionally precludes precise 
inferences about whether schools’ student incident reporting practices 
distributed in ways that skew at the individual-level against, for example, 
boys, racial/ethnic minorities, or students from low-income households. 
Similarly, in the absence of particularized and follow-up data on those 
individuals who engaged in the conduct that motivated school reports to law 
enforcement agencies, we cannot know what actually happened to those 
students reported.  As difficult as it might be to imagine that all such students 
were arrested and convicted, it is equally difficult to imagine that none of 
them were.  Moreover, the SSOCS data set similarly precludes analyses of 
how the array of possible outcomes—arrest, conviction, or release without 
arrest—distributed across those students referred to law enforcement 
agencies by their schools. 
In terms of our overall empirical strategy, we remain mindful that 
research design limitations preclude our findings from supporting any strong 
causal claims.  In a more perfect world, to assess any possible causal relations 
between a school’s rate of reporting student discipline incidents to law 
enforcement agencies and the magnitude of law enforcement officials at the 
schools we would, for example, randomly assign SRO/police to otherwise 
identical schools (that is, “identical” as it relates to our various dependent 
variables of interest).  Our lack of control over randomization precludes us 
from assessing casual direction with precision.  For example, the number of 
 
 86 Insofar as our dependent variable is a rate (or fraction) bounded between zero and one 
(inclusive), we favored fractional response regression models. Owing to the possibility of 
overdispersion, and in an abundance of caution, we also considered two alternative 
specifications in an effort to ensure that our core results were robust to model specification. 
Unreported results from a binominal regression model as well as a negative binominal 
regression model using actual raw school-level count data do not materially differ from results 
presented in tbl.2, infra. For examples of a similar empirical strategy, see, e.g., Daniel Hamlin 
& Angran Li, The Relationship Between Parent Volunteering in School and School Safety in 
Disadvantaged Urban Neighborhoods, 19 J. SCHOOL VIOLENCE 362, 366–68 (2020). 
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SRO/police at a school may be a product of pre-existing student disruption, 
crime levels, or student disciplinary incidents.  Similarly, it is also plausible 
that the presence of SRO/police at the school itself may inform a school’s 
rate of incident reporting to law enforcement agencies. 
As a second-best empirical strategy, we are limited to exploiting a rich 
array of control variables designed to help disentangle the complex relations 
between and among our dependent and key independent variables of interest.  
For example, as it specifically relates to our hypotheses on a relation between 
SRO/police at a school and that school’s student incident reporting to law 
enforcement agencies, our models seek to control for other likely factors that 
bear on a school’s probability of reporting incidents to law enforcement.  
While these important data and research design factors preclude strong causal 
claims, we feel that our results are positioned to contribute to the existing 
knowledge base on school crime and safety.87 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 reveals a statistically significant relation between the size of the 
SRO/police presence at a school and that school’s rate of student disciplinary 
referrals to law enforcement agencies.  An increase in the size of a school’s 
SRO/police presence consistently and strongly correlates with an increase in 
the school’s rate of law enforcement agency referrals.  And this result 
emerges for all student disciplinary incidents as well as for the subset of non-
violent incidents.  While we introduce separate analyses for non-violent 
student incidents on the theory that schools may be more comfortable with 
handling such incidents “in-house” and might have a history of doing so, 
when it comes to law enforcement reporting, results in Table 2 suggest that 
schools appear to have treated violent and non-violent student discipline 
incidents similarly. 
Results in Table 2 also introduce a second general theme that persists 
across our analyses: an overall paucity of statistically significant findings for 
an array of school-level variables plausibly germane to distributional 
concerns deriving from schools’ engagement with law enforcement agencies.  
It remains important to keep in mind that data limitations preclude analyses 
of how schools’ law enforcement referral practices distribute across various 
individual-level student sub-groups, particularly the comparatively more 
vulnerable student sub-groups.88 
 
 87 The data and empirical strategy factors that limit the force of the claims in this study 
are also similar to limitations that attach to prior studies on this topic. See, e.g., Nance, 
Students, supra note 3, at 971. 
 88 The SSOCS data set does not include individualized information of the actual students 
whose conduct triggered a law enforcement referral. 
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Our findings do, however, shed light on how law enforcement agency 
referrals distribute across schools with various student sub-group 
compositions.  Notably, Table 2 illustrates that—with one exception—a 
school’s percentage of students in poverty, black students, non-white 
students, and male students do not correspond with any systematic increase 
in that school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law enforcement 
agencies.  Similarly, variation in district-level mean per pupil spending does 
not achieve statistical significance.  The one exception is that an increase in 
a school’s percentage of students in poverty corresponds with an increased 
rate of reports to law enforcement agencies for non-violent student incidents 
(model 2). 
Other robust findings include the influences of a school’s disorder rate, 
student enrollment, and enrollment stability (or student mobility).  Another 
enduring influence is that elementary schools correspond with a reduced rate 
of school reporting to law enforcement agencies.  Finally, in all but one 
instance the mandatory reporting requirement variables do not emerge as 
significant influences on schools’ reporting behavior.  Moreover, in the one 
instance (model 2) where state reporting requirements for non-violent student 
conduct achieves statistical significance, it corresponds with a decrease in 
school reports of non-violent student incidents, thereby contributing further 
confusion about the influence of mandatory reporting requirements. 
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Table 2: Fractional Response Regression Models of School Report 







Num. of full- and pt.-time 
   SRO/police at school 
1.03** (0.01) 1.02** (0.01) 
Sch. student:teacher ratio 0.99 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 
Sch. student mobility % (in/out) 1.02* (0.01) 1.01* (0.00) 
Sch. urban. scale (rural-to-urban) 0.93 (0.07) 0.97 (0.05) 
Sch. disorder report rate 1.06** (0.02) 1.03** (0.01) 
Sch. area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 1.07 (0.12) 1.21* (0.11) 
Sch. student enrollment 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Elementary school (1=yes) 0.29** (0.08) 0.11** (0.02) 
Vio. incident report req. (1=yes) 0.59 (0.19) 1.04 (0.17) 
Non-vio incident report req. (1=yes) 0.85 (0.11) 0.70** (0.08) 
Sch. poverty % 1.00 (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 
Sch. nonwhite % 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Sch. black % 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 
Sch. male % 0.98 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
Sch. dist. mean per pupil spending 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
     
Constant 0.04 (0.03) 0.00** (0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.08  0.09  
N (raw) 1,890  1,890  
NOTES: The dependent variables include the rate of school reports for all student 
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and the rate of school reports for 
only non-violent student incidents to law enforcement agencies. Robust standard 
errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using 
the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used the odds ratio option and 
SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dep’t Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Stat., 2015–16 School Survey on Crime 
and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dep’t Com., Census Bureau, 2016 Public Elementary-
Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When we submit two persistent school-to-prison pipeline claims to 
more recent SSOCS data and more granular empirical testing, what emerges 
is clear support for one claim and a deficit of direct support for the other. 
When it comes to a school’s rate of reporting, we find consistent and 
robust evidence that a school’s SRO/police presence exerts upward influence 
on schools’ inclination to report and their rate of reporting.  As it relates to 
traditional distributional concerns, however, while many critics of an 
increasingly legalized approach to student discipline in schools claim that 
increases in school reporting, flowing from increases in schools’ SRO/police 
presence, disproportionately involve vulnerable student sub-groups, we do 
not find persuasive empirical support for such claims.  Notably, while our 
distributional-related findings generally comport with past empirical 
research using earlier SSOCS data sets, our findings remain somewhat at 
odds with popular wisdom.89 
Going forward, future research on school-to-prison pipeline claims 
would benefit substantially from improved individual-level data, especially 
as it relates to the students whose conduct triggered a possible school referral 
to law enforcement.  Another current data deficit relates to information on 
the criminal justice outcomes for those students whose conduct triggered a 
school referral to law enforcement. 
We close by emphasizing the complexity of this issue, the increasingly 
highly charged area of student discipline, and the growing demands from 
parents, students, and school administrators for greater school security and 
order.  The nuanced, complex, and varied interactions with a school’s 
SRO/police presence, and whether such a presence’s net costs exceed its 
benefits, is not obvious and likely varies across school districts and, perhaps, 
individual schools.  While such decisions will inevitably involve some 
degree of political calculation, surrendering such decisions to an unusually 
politicized environment—and with total disregard for available data—invites 
self-defeat.  Indeed, it is precisely moments like these, where political 
emotions appear especially raw and enflamed, when a good-faith 
commitment to following data is at a premium.90 
 
 
 89 See, e.g., George, supra note 6, at 494 (arguing that “children of color and low-income 
children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by police in schools”). 
 90 For a similar admonition, see, e.g., Michael Heise, Following Data and a Giant: 
Remembering Ted Eisenberg, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (2014). 
